“We must remind Putin that Russia can fall apart”

27.04.2026, 09:18 charter97.org

“We must remind Putin that Russia can fall apart”822.04.2026, 16:15 11,984 Mika AaltolaPhoto: terve.fiMoscow could run out of steam quickly.How can the European Union respond to Putin’s threats against the Baltic states? Is China really aligned with the Kremlin? Can Ukraine defend Europe? Member of the European Parliament, former Finnish presidential candidate, and political analyst Mika Aaltola answered these questions in an interview with Charter97.org.— China watches the unprovoked war of aggression which Russia launched against Ukraine and continues to carry on for four years and counting. What conclusions is Beijing making?— There is a strategic link between them. To my knowledge, Putin told Xi about the war beforehand. There was at least a kind of tacit approval of the war but within certain limits: China has been saying that nuclear weapons cannot be used in the conflict. Yet within these limits of escalatory window, China gave Russia free hands and has been providing supplies to Russia. Without the backbone of Chinese investments and Chinese sources of technology — like drone technology — Russia wouldn't have survived this war. One could say that the Chinese hand is behind the fact that Russia has been able to fight for four years.It is naive to say that with one phone call Xi could stop the war. I think, the time for that phone call was a couple of weeks before the war. After that, there was approval from China — at least some sort of a green light to do what Russia was going to do.But there was, of course, an unpleasant surprise for China — because they like the concept of harmony so much — that the war didn't go very well. The Russian failures in the war caused, I'm sure, head scratching in Beijing — how messy the war became. China doesn't like messy situations.So, strategically they are allies, but politically Russia and China sometimes have disagreements. Russia wanted to get more support from China — they were desperate. They got some oil and gas deals, some Chinese investments, but nothing like an overwhelming type of support. China was also careful not to be too much associated with the Russian war because nobody knows the outcome of it.Right now tactically Russia has won some victories, but strategically they are losing the war. Because they can not reach the strategic aims of the war: to swallow Ukraine, go to the Polish border, threaten Central Europe — basically cause a situation where Europe would have to either face a war or give Russia quite a lot — a new security order, with a return to the pre-1997 situation. That's how they frame it. So tactically yes, victories — but strategically, a loss.—Clearly in the beginning China was taken aback — it was not "Kiev in three days" as promised. But today, four years later, has China become more audacious towards Taiwan, or more cautious?— There is a Chinese saying that the best war is a war where you win by not fighting it. There is also a saying attributed to Napoleon, Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake. Trump is very radical as a president. He radically believes in American military might and the hard power component. He doesn't care much about soft power or loss of reputation. So, from the Chinese perspective, I think, right now it's best to stay out of the situation. They see that the West is getting more divided — that's good for them.At the same time, there is growing nationalism in China, combined with the decline of economic growth. When the economic justification for one-party rule is no longer there, then perhaps the more nationalistic justification takes over: unification of China, taking over Taiwan, threatening territorial expansion. Recently, they established a new artificial island very close to Vietnam. They are making moves constantly, changing the status quo in the surrounding regions.We now have two global wars — Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the Middle East in flames. Wars usually lead to further wars. For China there is a dilemma. Although Putin failed to demonstrate the leadership he hoped for, yet he still did do something. Trump also has been failing, perhaps, to show clear leadership, but he has been doing things. But China hasn't been showing anything from a traditional angle. There's a question mark: is China able to show anything?I don't know what Xi is thinking right now. He has been cleaning the military leadership, which shows either dissatisfaction with the leadership or that he's preparing something — wanting the lines to be in order, loyalty to be maximum, in preparation for something. That is one of those known unknowns: we know that China is going to take over Taiwan, but we don't know the date.— How does the war in the Middle East influence the developments on the battlefields of Ukraine?— When the Russian aggression had started, Ukraine needed weapons. In the beginning, Ukraine had a very limited number of effective anti-tank missiles from the US and some drones from Turkey. What Europe had was money — macro financial assistance for the Ukrainian state — and that was important. But you cannot fight wars with money. You cannot shoot with euros at the front line.But gradually the situation has turned. Ukrainians are becoming more self-sufficient in fighting the war. They have the best drones. They have missile capabilities that many of us here in the European Union only dream about. They have long-range missiles — we are just thinking about developing something years from now. Right now you can fund Ukrainian defense companies or collaborations between Western and Ukrainian defense companies and thus fight the war. That's a big change. And the costs for Russia are growing. Yes, Russia is a big state, 140 million people, but still they have wasted about a million casualties in the war.The situation was desperate when the war started. But now there's more and more hope and self-confidence. A year ago there was a period where the US decided to cut down all the aid besides intelligence aid, and they were trying to force peace onto Ukraine — that would have given Russia quite a lot. It seems that in Alaska there was overall agreement on a kind of partnership between Russia and the US. Trump has this strange fascination with Putin and the ideas of a reverse Kissinger (the detachment of China from the Soviet sphere in reverse). The overall geopolitical game is this: Washington wants to give Russia something in return for a system where China is more isolated. But I think they are mistaken in Washington, because for Russia this is a very beneficial situation — if you can milk two cows, China and the US at the same time, it's better than one cow. Russia has historically always wanted to be in a position where they can have allies of different types. But in the end the Trump administration's attempts will turn out to be foolish in this respect when it comes to Russia.— The way you see it there is a conscious policy of the Trump administration to decouple Russia from China?— Trump, in his usual way, reacts to a particular moment in a kind of emotional way — he doesn't give you geopolitical strategic plans. But the Vice President and the Secretary of State have both been expressing their hopes that an arrangement of this type could be made with Russia. They have said it in multiple interviews.— What is your assessment of the threat Russia potentially poses to the Baltic states?— We have to take those seriously, but Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is not even the Russia we thought it to be before the war. It's weaker. But there is a saying in Finland: Russia is never as weak as you think, and never as strong as you think. So it's something in between. What they are actually doing is showing their muscles, threatening this or that country. We should be prepared for the eventuality of war, because it could be that war is coming. Putin made foolish decisions before. It could be a different type of war, because the American National Security Strategy now says the US is going to defend Europe or NATO — if, and that's a big if — if it is in the American national interest. So there might be an incursion, something below the threshold of war, drone warfare or missile warfare that they claim is for the self-defense of the St. Petersburg region, for example. Something low-scale — I could imagine incursions across the border. But nothing major. They are contained right now. Ukraine is sucking all the resources they have, so starting another war would be very difficult for them.— But if that eventuality should occur — if there is a minor incursion into the Baltic states from Russia in one form or another — what is the responsibility of Northern Europe and Finland in particular?— The Northern European role is growing, and we see the world in the same way. Countries from the UK to the Netherlands, Denmark, the Baltic states, Poland, Sweden, Finland, and Norway — there is a common assessment of the Russian threat. I think Northern Europe is very solid. And if you think about the resources — the European Union's gross national product is 10 times bigger than Russia's. We have close to 500 million people living in the European Union. We have potential deterrence that is huge, and we have been trying to make that potential deterrence into actual deterrence. But I think we have been a little bit slow. I could be critical on that. We are thinking about a 90 billion loan to Ukraine — how about making it 10 times bigger, close to a thousand billion, not only for Ukraine but for common defense and industrial projects? That would make Putin blink. Because then he would see that there's so much resources being mobilized that he cannot match those resources. That would be one easy way and quick way to end the war.But instead we decided when the war started that let's have sanctions packages (now there are like 29 of them). Actually we have been prolonging the war. We could have stopped it right away. Americans u