Stubb: After the war with Russia, Finland agreed to lose territory. But it’s not going to be like that for Ukraine
Alexander or Alex Stubb is one of those politicians whose importance to Ukraine goes far beyond his official position. The former prime minister, now president, of Finland has been a staunch supporter of our country and maintains close, trusting relations with the Ukrainian leadership. But most importantly, he is one of the few Europeans who has a good personal relationship with US President Donald Trump.
This has made Stubb a natural intermediary in discussions with the United States concerning Ukraine and ending the war.
Finland’s own experience of war with Russia makes his involvement all the more significant. Incidentally, Alex’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Karelia, which was later occupied by the Soviet army.
We discussed these issues, as well as Ukraine’s European future, in Kyiv, which the president was visiting to attend celebrations marking Ukraine’s Independence Day.
Mr President, it’s good to see you here. How many times have you been to Kyiv? Five?
Well, quite a few times over the years, but since I became president, I think this is my fifth visit.
It was my first trip abroad when I became president in March 2024. I came here in April. I always find it important to come to Kyiv and talk to people, talk to the president, to the administration and to get a sense of what's going on.
Of course, things are looking much better now than they were two and a half years ago.
That’s good to hear, because now we are preparing for a harsh winter. At least, that’s the forecast we’ve been hearing. Does that coincide with your expectations?
Yes, certainly. It's always important to prepare for the worst in order to be able to be ready for it.
I think right now, if you look at the military side, the Ukrainian offensive has been very strong for about 8 to 9 months.
If we only look at the numbers, you’re basically eliminating 30,000 to 35,000 Russian troops per month, basically because you’re able to carry out long-range hits into the core of Russian society – I mean oil refineries in St Petersburg or Moscow, or Wildberries logistical centres, or Shahed factories.
All of these are indications that Ukraine is doing much better.
But that doesn't mean that winter is not coming. It will come, and that's one of the reasons why Finland is working a lot on energy supply to Ukraine, on electricity, on diesel generators, for instance, made by a Finnish company called Wärtsilä.
We have to prepare for the worst. That's just how it goes.
You referred to Russian losses. In my assessment, which is widely shared in Ukraine, Putin doesn’t count human lives. Yes, 35,000 Russians a month are being killed in action, but he doesn’t care.
I think you're right. If you look at reasons for Putin or for Russia to end this war, the economy will not be a reason. The Russian economy is doing badly, but that's not going to be a reason to end the war.
Dead or wounded soldiers are not going to be a reason either, because we’re already talking over a million, and it's not making a difference in Russia.
But the thing that might make a difference is people turning against the war.
And now we're seeing, with what I call legitimate opinion polls, about 65% of Russians wanting to end the war. And why is that? Because Ukraine is hitting the oil refineries, and therefore we’re seeing the rationing of petrol and diesel, we're seeing high prices, et cetera, et cetera.
And also, they've had to close the internet a couple of times [because of people’s public outrage – ed.].
So yes, I think you're right. It's not going to be about dead soldiers, it's going to be about a threat to the regime.
And of course the big question is: will Russia mobilise? Because if Russia mobilises 300,000 to 500,000 troops, that is going to have a direct impact on young men in St Petersburg and Moscow.
I believe they will mobilise. But do you think there could be some kind of revolt or uprising in Russia?
I'm a student of Russian history, but I don't pretend that I'll be able to predict the future.
The only thing I can say is that Ukraine is doing much better politically, militarily and financially than it was a year ago, let alone two or three years ago. And right now it's about numbers, and the numbers, in my mind, are on Ukraine’s side, as painful as it is at times.
I'm just fresh out of the commemoration of Ukraine’s independence and the decoration – posthumously – of soldiers who have lost their lives. It's a very moving moment.
We all understand that the cost of the war is extremely high for Ukraine and Ukrainian society. But at the same time, it's a question of preserving your independence and your sovereignty and your identity.
Do you personally expect, having access to all the information and intelligence, that the war could end soon, or at least that a ceasefire could come soon?
It's impossible to give it a date. I think we need to work pretty much on three tracks.
Track number one is to continue to supply Ukraine with the necessary means for it to continue to conduct the war. That means financial and military support, and right now one of the key elements is air defence and especially Patriots.
The second element is to continue the policy of sanctions, especially sanctioning the companies in Russia which provide components for, say, drones or missiles, so for the war industry.
And then the third track is the negotiation track, where we see a lot of public negotiations, but there should be some negotiations happening in the background as well.
Are there any signs indicating that Putin is ready to start meaningful negotiations?
To give you a very blunt and direct answer, the answer is no.
It's a very sort of classic Russian tactic.
But eventually there will be a day when perhaps Russia understands that it has lost this war
or that it will not achieve its strategic aims, and that is the time to work on it. So we work a lot with the Americans and of course with our Ukrainian friends almost every day, and with the Europeans, to try to bring Russia to the negotiating table. But I can't give you a deadline for it.
And that's why we need to prepare for a harsh winter.
Once negotiations start, what would the role of Europe be?
I come from a small country, so I feel very strongly that I need to stay in the back office.
My job is to provide information from Ukraine to America, from America to Ukraine, and if there is a need for information to be provided to the Russians, I'm happy to do that as well.
But I do feel that the Americans are in the lead on the negotiations.
They provide the umbrella.
But of course, we cannot take decisions on Europe over Europe. So I try to work in the back office and engage with as many people as I can.
If you were offered the position of negotiator, would you agree?
First of all, it's a hypothetical question, so you can't answer in that sense.
Secondly, if that question were to be posed – of course! But I think it will be a team of negotiators.
I'm happy to do a lot of the background work – I don't need any of the exposure to it.
Do you know why we in Ukraine have such great respect for your experience?
Probably because it's so similar. In 1939, Russia attacked us, and we went through the Winter War in very harsh conditions. But that was only 105 days, whereas you've been at war now for over 1,600 days with four harsh winters.
And then of course Finland had the War of Continuation.
For us, it was a fight for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. And as I've said before, Finland retained its independence, unlike our Baltic friends at the time. They lost it.
But we did lose a part of our sovereignty.
We weren't as free as Ukraine will be after this war.
So yes, there is an understanding of the history of Russian imperialism and therefore a very strong sympathy with Ukrainians.
Do you think there are any recipes or lessons that Ukraine can learn from your experience of that time?
The only thing that comes to mind is a word in Finnish called sisu.
It’s basically resilience and grit and grinding it out.
And I see a lot of that in Ukrainian society today, when I talk to a lot of my Ukrainian friends. Or if I talk to foreign ambassadors here, they just say, "The Ukrainians are so cool. How are they able to sustain this?" That's about sisu and resilience.
But you cannot really compare war over 80 years ago to modern warfare.
One thing that is quite similar is that if you look at the ratio of Russians [killed in action] versus Ukrainians, and the ratio of Soviets versus Finns, the figures are quite similar at the end of the day.
But I think, in earnest, not only have you already won the war, but at the end of the day, you will win the war. And that is linked to the theory of warfare. If a big aggressor tries to deny the independence, sovereignty and full territorial integrity of a country, and that country survives it, then by definition it wins.
That's why we in Finland talked about a "defence victory" at the end of the day.
You mean that Finland won the war?
Yes, definitely. I mean, for us, we call it a defence victory, because we survived. We exist as a nation, as Finland.
Despite losing territory?
Yes. Wars are not an accounting exercise.
And I'm not by any means suggesting that Ukraine should lose territory.
There are so many different ways of dealing with this. But in our case, there was a peace agreement, and in that, we decided, okay, this is how the borders are going to be drawn.
But for Ukraine I don't think it is going to be like that, and it doesn't have to be like that.
I'll give you just one example.
Only this year, Russia has gained roughly 900 sq km of territory in Donetsk and the Eastern part, whereas Ukraine has regained or liberated 800 sq km.
We understand that this is now a war of attrition. And a war of attrition where – sorry to be morbid – the killing ratio is one Ukrainian for eight Russians.
So it's not sustainable for Russia in the long run. And they know that. It's just a question of when they come to admit it to
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- August, 26
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27 of August 2026