For the First Time, Ukraine Has Caused a Gasoline Shortage Even in Moscow

14.09.2026, 22:20 uatv.ua

The Kremlin faces a choice among the army, revenues, and the civilian economy

As a result of systematic Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, the fuel shortage has reached the capital region. Gas stations in Moscow are once again operating under sales restrictions, with major chains limiting purchases to 30–60 liters of gasoline per car. The lines at the capital’s filling stations have become the clearest evidence that the war has reached the center of the country.

This is a qualitatively new stage in Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, since it has moved from abstract statistics on reduced refining capacity to an effect that every Russian consumer can see. The question now is whether Ukraine can create a lasting dilemma for the Kremlin: a choice between supplying the army, preserving export revenues, and maintaining the normal functioning of the civilian economy.

Read the FULL article by Valentyn Gladkykh, political analyst, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank.

Gladkykh lays out the concrete restrictions now in place in Moscow: Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil producer, has capped gasoline sales at 30 liters per car across its stations, down from the 90-liter limit it allowed in June, while Gazprom Neft has set 40-liter limits at automated stations and 60 liters at conventional ones, Tatneft has capped gasoline at 50 liters, and Lukoil has restricted sales across Moscow and the surrounding region.

The expert notes that 95-octane gasoline has vanished from many stations entirely, with prices in some places reaching 120 rubles per liter, and journalists documenting long lines at filling stations in and around the capital. He adds that some chains have also banned filling more than one jerrycan per customer to discourage hoarding.

Gladkykh emphasizes the problem extends far beyond Moscow, noting Russian media are calling this the second wave of the summer fuel crisis, with authorities tightening fuel-sale controls in at least ten regions and hours-long lines reported in twelve. He points to the Lipetsk region reviving odd-even license plate rationing at filling stations, and Sochi asking residents and tourists to leave their cars at home.

He notes the crisis hasn’t eased in Siberia or the Far East either, while occupied Crimea continues facing acute shortages — all against the backdrop of a record 21 Ukrainian drone strikes on oil refineries in August. The expert traces the crisis’s momentum back to May, noting it had spread to nearly every region by July, signaling a sustained trend rather than an isolated disruption.

Gladkykh cites the scale of industrial fallout: oil refining fell to its lowest level in over 20 years, averaging about 3.8 million barrels per day in August, driving a 20% drop in gasoline supply and a 23% drop in diesel supply. He describes the Kremlin’s attempt to shield the capital by redirecting gasoline from eastern regions — a move that only deepened shortages in at least ten other regions, revealing enough fuel to maintain Moscow’s façade of normalcy but not enough to supply the whole country. He notes the redistribution hit regions as far-flung as Krasnodar, Primorsky, and Krasnoyarsk Krais.

The expert catalogs the state’s standard toolkit of responses: a ban on gasoline and diesel exports, with the producer export ban extended through September and broader restrictions set to run through January, alongside a shift toward importing petroleum products. He singles out the rollback of fuel quality standards as the most telling measure, with the government temporarily permitting Euro-2, Euro-3, and Euro-4 gasoline — standards phased out more than a decade ago — noting Euro-2 fuel’s higher sulfur content can damage engines and worsen air pollution.

Gladkykh frames this as exposing the Kremlin’s core strategic dilemma: the same shrinking fuel supply is needed simultaneously by the front-line military, the export sector generating hard currency and budget revenue, and the civilian economy underpinning social stability. He argues the export ban protects the domestic market at the cost of revenue, while diverting fuel to Moscow eases capital pressure at the provinces’ expense — every choice trading off against another, with the dilemma sharpening the longer the strike campaign continues. He contends it’s this sustained pressure, not individual strikes, that creates the real strain, since repairs take weeks and new strikes can hit before previous damage is even fixed, letting destruction outpace reconstruction.

Gladkykh closes with a measured assessment: a gasoline shortage alone won’t force Kremlin capitulation, and he notes Russia’s energy minister publicly insists there’s enough fuel nationwide even while acknowledging the lines. Still, he argues this marks the first time in the war that Ukrainian strikes’ consequences have reached an ordinary Moscow resident rather than only those in front-line or remote regions — a war Moscow has worked hard to keep distant from its political and economic center now arriving at an ordinary Moscow gas station. He concludes this shift matters less for the specific figures on lost refining capacity than for how it’s turning the war into daily reality for people who, until now, had mostly experienced it through television.

Read the FULL article on The Gaze: For the First Time, Ukraine Has Caused a Gasoline Shortage Even in Moscow

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