Estonian defence minister: "Russia could attack NATO. I'm not sure if we can deter the mad person"

14.10.2026, 06:59 eurointegration.com.ua

Martin Herem is Estonia’s new minister of defence, having taken office less than a month ago. His predecessor, Hanno Pevkur, was forced to resign amid a scandal over arms procurement for Ukraine. Despite this, Herem stated before being appointed that he is not a politician, but a career officer in the military.

And the new minister isn’t just any officer.

He is a full general, holding the highest military rank. Herem served as Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces from 2018 to 2022, and in that capacity he witnessed the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In this interview, he also acknowledges that he has been on the front line in Ukraine.

While in Kyiv, General Herem met with the editor of European Pravda to discuss this, as well as his expectations regarding Russia’s next attack, including whether Russia might attack NATO.

European Pravda is the first non-Estonian media outlet to interview Martin Herem since his appointment as defence minister.

Ukrainians are used to saying that Ukraine will definitely not be the last country that is attacked by Russia. Do you believe that as well?

If I take into account the attitude of the Russian state [towards its neighbours], and if I look at what they are producing right now for military purposes, then I think when they stop here [in Ukraine] – it doesn't matter how, whether you kick them out beyond the border, or the war is frozen – then every day they will start collecting military fat. And given their attitude, they will definitely test somebody.

Whether their first attack will be against Estonia, I'm not sure. It could be Latvia or somewhere else.

What they want to achieve is influence. They need power.

For that they don't need to occupy us, for example, Estonia.

They need to harm us and make us distrust each other, both in Estonia and among the Allies.

And if we have any nasty, ugly aggression, and Russians are gathering along the border, then we don’t want to see it again. And then we may choose the Russia-proposed solution.

That's exactly what they want: influence and instability.

You referred to Estonia and Latvia as examples, I believe, because both are in NATO. Does that mean that you expect an attack on NATO?

They may do it against NATO just to break NATO.

Acting below [the threshold of] Article Five, you mean?

Below Article Five, or under Article Five.

Because when Article Five is invoked, and we win this conflict but the victory is too ugly, then many will start blaming NATO and each other. And that’s the moment when the Russians will offer their solution: "Let's talk, let's do business as usual," and so on. And once we are under Russian influence, we go down.

I grew up in the Soviet Union, I have some understanding about this.

And Estonia has a history which teaches that Russia always attacks.

For the last thousand years, yes.

Can you see any way of preventing those attacks from happening?

I'm not sure if we can deter the mad person. But what we have to do is to prepare. And that's the only thing.

We have to prepare very seriously [for an attack] and if we do that, we may prevent it.

We have to be ready.

What are some practical ways in which small countries can prepare to contain the aggression?

First, our own self-defence capability must be very, very strong.

We must be ready to fight like Ukraine – on the front line and in the rear. And also to be able to eliminate all the threats coming from the enemy's depth, which means we need to develop our own deep strike [long-range] capability as well.

And we cannot do it on our own. We need our allies. Usually Estonia is seen as a country without strategic depth. I say we have a strategic depth. All of Europe is our rear.

That’s why we have to pay special attention to the sea. And again, it's not aggressive, it's not blocking the Baltic Sea or anything. It's ensuring the sea lines of communication at any given time. And that's what we’re doing right now together with our allies.

Estonia is one of the countries active in the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force).

JEF is a tool within NATO – it's not additional to NATO. JEF could make us faster to provide some support, but it still must follow the NATO plan. So it's nothing additional. It’s not an alternative – it's a small NATO inside NATO.

Does Ukraine have a place in the JEF?

I'm too young a minister to have any experience of discussions about Ukraine joining JEF, but I would say, if Ukraine has aspirations or a plan to join JEF, Estonia will definitely support it.

Let’s talk about Ukraine’s role in helping Estonia and NATO to deter threats and defend itself. You've just signed a drone deal. What are some practical ways to implement it?

The drone deal brings us not just technology, but experience.

And it's not just about how to operate an interceptor drone. It's about how to build our system of air defence or our system of fortifications, our counter-drone system. You have a lot of knowledge, a lot of data which we must adapt and bring to Estonia.

So it's not just the technology, and not even just the experience – it's about the knowledge.

How does it work in practical terms?

It could work in many ways. One of them is that we must come here to Ukraine and learn on the ground. Also, we must bring Ukrainian experts to Estonia to get advice on how we are building our defence line. That includes not just the fortifications or positions, but also sensors, energy, communications, all the necessary counter-drone assets and so on.

To be honest, it’s also about how we prepare our rear area – hospitals, local municipalities, police stations, energy, everything – against whatever air threat, be it an Iskander ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or hundreds of Shahed-type drones.

You mentioned that you could come here. Do you expect Estonian, i.e. NATO, military personnel in Ukraine during the war?

To be honest, we have been visiting since 2022.

I was here for the first time in July 2022 – I came here to learn. At that time, I was Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces.

How does that fit with statements that NATO military personnel are not in Ukraine?

In July 2022, I was in Estonian uniform on the front line, and the front line then was a few kilometres from Kharkiv. I was there in uniform.

The difference is that we do not operate here. We learn. So we don't take up weapons, we don't operate the radar or whatever. But we visit.

And this is not a threat to Russia at all.

But it is, because you bring what you’ve learned back to Estonia.

Estonia will never use this knowledge unless Russia crosses our border.

We have no plan to cross the border and attack Russia. We have no such plan and never have had. But if they come, then we will use everything we have learned from Ukraine.

Russia is not that active in conventional attacks against Estonia, but in the hybrid domain they are. Would you agree?

In the conventional domain, I don't think we should expect anything active from Russia as long as they are tied down here in Ukraine. But actually, with conventional power, sometimes you don't have to use it.

It's enough to show it.

It’s like my fist. (The general shows his fist.) Threatening with a fist is also something. Because if you show it, then one day you may use it. And since Russia is showing it, like they do today against us, that’s also part of conventional power.

How are they showing it?

They're building the Leningrad Military Region, for example. They're building new units. They are producing tanks, artillery, ammunition, aircraft, everything, behind our border.

Why are they doing this? They know NATO has no plan to cross the border. We have no plan to attack.

Then why are they building fortifications and new military bases behind the border of Finland? Why did they create this Leningrad Military Region and so on?

They’re doing it to threaten us, and maybe to prepare.

And what about hybrid threats?

Referring to hybrid operations, we used to talk about sabotage, cyber operations, information operations, whatever.

But in general, hybrid actions serve to prepare the conditions and the environment, keeping the conflict warm.

Because if you want to use conventional power, you need to explain to your own nation and to third countries that you had a problem with Estonia, or with the West. You need a kind of justification for your actions.

And no one will know later that it was you who caused the sabotage. The people in Russia only see that "we had a problem with them and we had to solve it". Now, [Russian] Foreign Minister [Sergei] Lavrov has said very clearly: everybody supporting Ukraine will be punished by us. He said it one or two months ago, and now we see their actions.

But all these hybrid actions just cause harm – it hurts – but it's not a threat to our being, our existence.

Isn’t it? People in Estonia expect NATO to protect them against hybrid threats, and it doesn’t. This could also diminish public trust in the Alliance.

There are no good solutions, no good response, to this problem.

However, if you look at what the Russians have done during the last few months, for example – that armed drone in Germany [that attacked the airport], or when they set fire [to a military production base] in Estonia – what was our response? The Germans increased their support to Ukraine. Estonia decided to support Ukraine through PURL with another €10 million.

Next week we will have a meeting in Tallinn to discuss what kind of support we will send to Ukraine next year – and that will be more than €100 million just from Estonia.

These are actually the responses to all these acts, sabotage and so on. We say to Russia: you can try, but we will not stop.

And one more element of our response is the public disclosure of Russian actions.

If there is something burning, blowing up or falling down, and the Russian special services are behind it, then we must say that openly and attribute it to them as fast as possible. If Russia is not the cause and it's just criminal activity, t