From "poor, corrupt Ukraine" to EU candidate: how Italy won over Germany and opened the EU’s door to Kyiv
Pier Francesco Zazo was one of the few ambassadors of EU member states who was in Kyiv on 24 February 2022. At the time he had headed Italy’s diplomatic mission in Ukraine for more than a year, and he remained in the position until 2024.
The Italian ambassador did not have a particularly high profile during his time in Ukraine, although everyone involved in supporting Ukraine and its path towards EU membership was aware of his personal role in backing the country and its European integration.
Now Zazo, who will soon turn 67, has left the diplomatic and public service.
"Now I am a free man, and I am happy to speak openly about what I know and what I think," he admitted during his interview with the editor of European Pravda.
We took advantage of Zazo’s visit to Kyiv to hear his candid recollections of how Ukraine has been perceived by its partners, how attitudes changed after the full-scale war began, how the negotiations over EU candidate status were conducted, and what we can expect going forward. And this isn’t just about Italy.
You’ve heard the news about Iryna Mudra. How do people in Europe perceive the news that high-level Ukrainian politicians are suspected of such serious crimes?
It definitely doesn't help Ukraine. Being pro-Ukrainian, I always try to explain the positive side of these cases: I tell people that this proves Ukraine is really fighting against corruption; that the anti-corruption bodies work well; that it’s a process which is ongoing and needs time.
But still, this is a weak point.
People who sympathise more with Russia use this as a strong argument: "This proves that the Italian government shouldn’t give money to a corrupt Ukraine."
But it’s not a disaster. I see many articles explaining the positive side – that Ukraine is moving in the right direction. The mere fact that you’re able to investigate corruption at the highest level is definitely a good sign. And one more positive aspect which seems important is that Ukrainians are ready to go out into the streets and protest. That would never happen in an autocratic country like Russia.
Therefore you can see it in a positive way and in a negative way.
Do these explanations work in Italy?
It depends who you talk to.
Italian society is very polarised.
If you talk to pro-European Italians, they appreciate your fight for freedom and the rule of law. Also, those who have some knowledge about Ukraine and the war tend to recognise that Ukraine’s transition to democratic rules is happening.
Also, in my experience, these explanations work well with those who are neutral towards Ukraine, who don’t have any prejudice. I can tell you that because I often talk to this type of person. They want to understand; they listen to me very carefully, knowing that I have previous experience both in Ukraine and in Russia.
But there are also Italians with a pro-Russian attitude, and I'm not able to convince them with arguments. There are quite a few people in Italy who have never been to Ukraine, but they have a position based on the clear Russian narrative.
They would tell me that everything was staged in Bucha. And if I tell them that I have been there personally, that I’ve spoken with the mothers of people who were killed, that I saw a lot as an ambassador, they don't trust me. I see no way to convince them.
Fortunately, this type of person is a minority.
So Ukraine has to work more with the people who are in between – and they are ready to listen.
What does Ukraine mean to people in Italy today? And what did it mean to them a few years ago? I imagine that 10-15 years ago, the main things people in Italy associated with Ukraine were [the footballer] Andriy Shevchenko, perhaps Chernobyl, and the idea that Ukraine was somewhere near Moscow.
Yes, that's very true. This perception was formed under strong influence from Russia.
Since 1990, Ukraine had been perceived as a poor, corrupt country with a strong presence of oligarchic powers, plus Chernobyl and environmental disasters. The image was completely negative, and it persisted not just until 2014, but until the outbreak of the full-scale war in 2022.
One of the few positive aspects about Ukraine was the Ukrainian diaspora, which was respected in Italy, but it was not a very influential one. Many Ukrainians worked [as carers] for elderly people, and they never created problems with the justice system. Here comes a very important point, which may surprise you today, but in Italy Ukrainians were perceived as a community with a very weak national identity.
The community did not fight that stereotype, partly because Ukrainians abroad are quite individualistic.
This was also partially a Russian narrative, as Russia worked hard to convince Italians and Europeans that all the former Soviet Union countries basically have a Russian identity and sooner or later they will return to Great Mother Russia.
That created an incredibly simplified image of Ukraine, even among my colleagues.
Do you mean that even within the Foreign Ministry, some diplomats saw Ukraine as essentially part of Russia’s sphere?
Yes. Even in 2021, when I came here as an ambassador, there were very strong narratives against Ukraine. For instance, many people in Rome believed that Ukraine was suppressing Russian-speaking people, that people in South-Eastern Ukraine were being discriminated against because they spoke Russian.
The first thing I did on arriving in Ukraine was to go to Kharkiv and Odesa and start writing reports to my capital explaining that that wasn’t true: that many people speak Russian, but they feel Ukrainian.
Of course not every diplomat had that wrong image of Ukraine, but many did.
Russia really worked hard in the field of disinformation – it’s where they are strong. Also with all this narrative of "there's no Ukraine", "Ukraine is an artificial state", "they're just part of Great Mother Russia".
Therefore, the Italians were really caught by surprise not just by the fact that the war had started, but even more by the fact that Ukrainians resisted.
Everyone in Italy was convinced that in two or three days everything would be over. Even my colleagues thought so.
What other myths or misconceptions about Ukraine were widespread in Italy?
I would stress the underestimation of the economic potential of Ukraine.
For me, it was always clear that Ukraine has huge potential, but in Italy, it was never known. People were usually surprised if I said that Ukraine was the second most important republic in former Soviet Europe. No one knew before 2022 that you had a very strong defence industry, space industry. No one had heard about your success in digitalisation.
For the majority of people, everything good was related to Russia.
Everything bad could be Ukrainian.
Andriy Shevchenko played for AC Milan. Did Italians see him as Ukrainian, or simply as a talented footballer from the former Soviet Union?
Yes, and this contributed very positively, though it was never enough compared to the negatives.
By the way, I was among the first Italians who knew that Shevchenko was going to play in Italy. At the time, I was working here in Kyiv as a consul, and I issued him the visa to move to Milan. I remember it well – it was 1999.
I love football, and I used to watch the games of Dynamo Kyiv here. I knew that he was a great player.
I called some of my friends in Milan and said, "Look, you know who is moving to your team?" and my friends answered: "What? Ukraine? Do they play football?"
After a few months, they called me back saying: "Yeah, he's a great player!"
What changed in Italy’s perception of Ukraine after 2022?
As I said, your resilience was a huge surprise, and the attitude also changed completely. Ukrainians were admired.
Let me give you one example that demonstrates this change. Before 2022, there were no books about Ukrainian history available in Italy. There was only The Gates of Europe by Serhii Plokhy. Now there are many books about Ukraine available. Italians have discovered that there is a Ukrainian nation and a Ukrainian national identity.
What changed?
The Russian invasion came as a huge shock. Italian foreign policy changed immediately, in 24 hours. I always say that paradoxically, my work [as an ambassador] became easier after the invasion.
Italian business and public opinion quickly turned to being pro-Ukrainian. To some degree, it was sympathy for the victims (even if many did not believe Ukraine would manage to survive). It has slowly decreased. After four and a half years of war, people still support Ukraine politically, but they would rather go out into the streets to protest for Gaza, not for Ukraine.
But the political position has completely changed.
How did that change happen? Given that Russian narratives were quite influential, including within parts of the government and the Foreign Ministry, and that Italy had traditionally been relatively close to Russia, how did it become such a strong supporter of Ukraine? Was Mario Draghi instrumental in that shift?
Absolutely yes, but not only him.
I would say that first of all, it was Italian public opinion. People didn't even understand the difference between Ukraine and Russia, they used to have strong cultural links with Russia, and the invasion came as a shock to Italian public opinion.
In Italy, nobody expected full-scale Russian aggression.
I can tell you that until 23 February, nobody in Rome believed there would be an invasion. Nobody! I was here in Kyiv and I was sure that Russia would attack, but nobody even wanted to talk to me.
Up until 24 February, Italy perceived all the developments as: okay, we are G7 members, so we participate in joint sanctions and don’t block them, but we are not very enthusiastic supporters.
On the morning of 24 February, everything changed immediately.
I went to the embassy and everyone called me – the foreign minister, the prime minister. And the reaction was immediate, even if they were caught by surprise (although later I discovered that Mario Draghi
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