Outpacing Albania. How Ukraine should meet most critical benchmarks in EU accession negotiations

11.06.2026, 13:53 eurointegration.com.ua

Ukraine's EU accession negotiations are gradually shifting from major political decisions to less visible but far more complex technical work: fulfilling the commitments undertaken as part of the negotiation process. It is at this stage that it will become clear how quickly and consistently Ukraine will be able to move towards membership.

One of the most significant milestones at this stage of the accession process is meeting the interim benchmarks.

This entails carrying out a series of reforms in key areas of the rule of law, justice, and public order. These benchmarks were established by the European Union under Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) of the Fundamentals Cluster.

The candidate country must not only align its legislation with EU law, but also apply these norms within existing public institutions, or even establish new ones.

The aim of such reforms is to demonstrate that progress in the fields of the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, security, and border management goes beyond legislative changes and results in tangible, lasting improvements to the functioning of the state.

This is why these benchmarks carry particular importance. The provisional closure of any other negotiating chapter is contingent upon Ukraine fulfilling the interim benchmarks in Chapters 23 and 24. In other words, this is a stage of the negotiations without which the process cannot advance to its final phase, even across other chapters.

The implementation of the interim benchmarks must be confirmed in a separate European Commission report – the Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR). Based on this assessment, the EU Member States will make a key political decision regarding the country's further advancement in the accession negotiations.

The experience of other countries shows how important it is not to waste time at this stage.

After Montenegro received interim benchmarks from the EU in 2013, it took more than ten years, until June 2024, for the country to receive a positive assessment from the European Commission on the IBAR. A range of factors contributed to this: limited political will, frequent changes in governments and negotiating teams, weak institutions, and the broadly and imprecisely formulated nature of the EU-defined benchmarks themselves.

Albania has shown a different trajectory.

The Fundamentals Cluster was opened in October 2024, and in May 2026 the EU Council confirmed that Albania had generally fulfilled the interim benchmarks under this cluster. The country completed this stage in less than two years.

This is an important lesson for Ukraine. We cannot afford the Montenegro scenario: a decade of slow movement, inconsistency and loss of political momentum. Ukraine's interest is to replicate the Albanian experience, and possibly even exceed its pace.

That is why the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, together with its partners, has prepared a study on how Ukraine should meet the interim benchmarks under Chapters 23 and 24. Its aim is to convert the benchmarks set by the European Commission into a detailed and practical implementation plan. (The study is currently available in English, and the Ukrainian version is being prepared.)

In judicial reform, the key issue is the stable and integrity-based functioning of judicial governance bodies, primarily the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ). The capacity of these bodies underpins the selection of judges, the filling of vacancies, disciplinary proceedings, judicial accountability and the overall performance of the judicial system.

This calls for a combination of legislative amendments, including ensuring continued involvement of international experts in the HQCJ selection process, addressing deficiencies in the appointment procedures for the HCJ and HQCJ, and strengthening their legal frameworks, as well as institutional steps aimed at improving and digitalising workflows and enhancing institutional capacity.

In the anti-corruption sphere, the focus is on ensuring the inevitability of criminal liability for corruption, strengthening the independence of anti-corruption bodies (primarily the NABU and SAP), removing legal obstacles to the investigation of corruption offences, reviewing statutes of limitation and ensuring that anti-corruption bodies can effectively carry out their mandate.

In the area of fundamental human rights, the challenges involve long-standing structural problems: the non-enforcement of court decisions, torture and ill-treatment, inadequate conditions in places of detention, the lack of a comprehensive personal data protection system, weak anti-discrimination frameworks and insufficient investigation of violent crimes.

In the field of migration, asylum, and border management, the main task is not only to update legislation but also to establish a modern system of coordination between authorities. Implementing EU standards requires measures in the areas of international protection, legal migration (particularly labor migration), combating illegal migration and migration-related offences and immigration policy for foreign nationals. In the area of border management, efforts will focus on implementing the new Integrated Border Management Strategy and establishing a National Schengen Management System.

Law enforcement reform involves the transformation of key institutions: the SBI, the National Police, the BES, the SSU, the ARMA, the penitentiary system, the probation service and other bodies. Key priorities include building a robust legislative framework, conducting transparent selection processes for senior positions, implementing external audits and reinforcing accountability and public oversight.

It is already clear that the implementation of interim benchmarks may encounter a number of risks capable of slowing or even blocking progress.

In the judicial sphere, the key risk relates to whether the significant renewal of the HCJ and HQCJ membership, expected as early as next year, can be effectively managed. It is important to maintain the quality and rigor of the selection process established in 2022-2023 and to address any shortcomings in the selection procedures in advance.

If the governing structures of these bodies are not formed in a timely manner, this may halt nearly all personnel processes in the judicial system, including judicial selection, qualification assessments, disciplinary procedures, and dismissals,

thereby effectively blocking the implementation of the relevant benchmarks.

The anti-corruption sphere remains politically sensitive, as reforms in this area directly affect the balance of powers and accountability in the state. Any strengthening of the NABU and SAP's powers is often perceived by political actors as a potential threat, which generates a cautious or even critical attitude towards the relevant reforms. This creates a risk of delays or partial implementation of key decisions.

In the area of fundamental rights, the main challenge is that reforms require significant resources, time, and changes in related sectors. They may require revising Soviet-era codes, rethinking the social security system and its financing, reforming investigative practices and creating new institutions, such as an independent personal data protection authority.

Certain measures may trigger public or political controversy, including anti-discrimination legislation, the legalization of same-sex partnerships, provisions for alternative service during mobilisation, migration policy changes, and penitentiary reform.

In the area of migration and border management, effective inter-agency coordination will be the key challenge. This area involves various ministries, agencies, and international partners, while in practice their interaction is often difficult to ensure, particularly due to limited coordination mechanisms, overlapping mandates and imperfect procedural rules.

Law enforcement reform faces risks associated with martial law: certain reform components, particularly the reform of the SSU, can only be fully implemented after the war is over.

Accordingly, the task of the non-governmental sector is to work in a structured way with both government and society to prevent these risks from slowing down reforms and the negotiation process.

A distinct role in the implementation of the interim benchmarks falls to the Verkhovna Rada. All areas will require considerable legislative effort, with parliamentary involvement needed, depending on the sector, for between 25% and 70% of measures. In many cases, it is legislation that launches the reform, which is then implemented at the institutional level.

Without swift, consistent, and high-quality parliamentary work, progress in implementing the benchmarks will be impossible. The effectiveness of parliamentary work will also depend significantly on how promptly and effectively the government prepares the required draft legislation.

In discussions about "accelerated membership" or "intermediate integration formats", it is important not to lose sight of one fundamental point: for many EU member states, even those strongly supportive of Ukraine, progress in the rule of law remains a non-negotiable condition.

This reflects both the experience of previous enlargement rounds, when some new EU members were still unable to fully complete rule-of-law reforms years after accession, and the need for Ukraine to convincingly demonstrate real change in the areas of law and justice.

European politicians need persuasive arguments for their voters and colleagues.

The state that joins the EU must not only proclaim its commitment to the rule of law and anti-corruption; it must demonstrate real and sustained change. That is why the implementation of interim benchmarks is not a bureaucratic formality, but a political test of Ukraine's capacity to advance towards membership.

The path to the effective closure of negotiatin