Why The West is Secretly Terrified of Russia’s Total Collapse, — Interview with Jonathan Fink

16.05.2026, 18:17 uatv.ua

Vladimir Putin’s regime is trapped by its own war. In an interview, geopolitical analyst Jonathan Fink states: the Russian system has turned into a “military pyramid,” where stopping combat operations could trigger economic and political collapse of the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is transitioning from a country dependent on Western aid to one of the main technological centers of modern warfare. Ukrainian drones and combat experience are already changing global security rules. Why does the West fear Russia’s disintegration and how is Ukraine becoming a new “rule maker”? Let’s break it down!

— Russia always chooses war—even in times that seem peaceful. It could simply declare victory, claim all goals of the so-called “special military operation” have been achieved, and stop. Everyone would know it is not true, but the opportunity exists. Why is that window not used? Is it weakness?

— It is certainly a weakness. But it is not just about Vladimir Putin as an individual. His regime is now structurally dependent on war.

The information system—figures like Solovyov and the so-called “Z-patriots”—relies on war as a source of content and revenue. They are monetizing the war. These groups may represent only a minority of the population, but they are ideologically committed to continuing it.

Putin has built part of his power base on them, yet he does not fully control them and may even fear them turning against him. Internal repression, including internet shutdowns, is not only about external threats like drones but also about controlling domestic instability.

At the same time, the economy has been reshaped into what can be described as a military “Ponzi scheme.” If the war ends, serious economic consequences follow. Morality does not factor into this—it is pure political calculation. Putin has effectively trapped himself. For him, peace is not an exit—it is political death.

— What should the West do in response to this strategic deadlock?

— Western policy has long been guided by the idea of preventing the collapse of Russia. This has been consistent across administrations—from George H. W. Bush to Joe Biden and even under Donald Trump.

There is a deep-rooted concern in Western political and military thinking that a catastrophic collapse of Russia must be avoided. However, this often conflates Russia as a state with Russia as an imperial system.

From a Ukrainian perspective, many argue that long-term security requires the decentralization or fragmentation of that imperial system. Otherwise, Russia will continue to pose a threat across generations.

The key issue is control over resources. Historically, Russia has repeatedly approached collapse but reasserted control by regaining access to resources. If it maintains control over energy revenues and security structures, it can continue indefinitely.

— But Ukraine is changing the situation—drone deals, innovation, new partnerships. Do ordinary Western citizens recognize this shift from Ukraine being a recipient of aid to becoming a strategic partner?

— Not really. Most people are not aware of these developments or their significance. Even in countries strongly supportive of Ukraine, there is limited understanding of how fundamentally the situation has changed.

People may recognize that Ukraine has survived and that Russia is struggling, but they do not grasp the scale of the transformation.

Ukraine should not focus on trying to communicate this shift. It should continue doing what is necessary. Importantly, it is no longer in a position where it must accept every external condition. It now has leverage—it can reject offers that come with unacceptable constraints.

— So Ukraine itself has effectively become a security guarantee?

— Yes. The only real security guarantee preventing Russian forces from advancing further into Europe is Ukraine itself—Ukrainian resistance, Ukrainian innovation, and Ukrainian sacrifice.

That may sound dramatic, but those who understand the dynamics of Russian imperial policy recognize that it is not an exaggeration. If Ukraine were to stop fighting, Russia could redirect its focus elsewhere.

For example, Russia is already expanding its drone capabilities significantly, including large-scale specialized units. The threat has not diminished.

— Do you believe Russia could attack the Baltic states?

— It is absolutely capable of doing so. The real question is whether it would consider it strategically worthwhile.

The invasion of Ukraine was not strategically sound either, but it was based on the belief that Russia could succeed quickly. That same logic could apply elsewhere.

Russian decision-making often revolves around whether it believes it can act without facing overwhelming consequences. The objectives would include weakening NATO, undermining the European Union, and fragmenting Europe into smaller, more compliant states.

However, an attack on the Baltic states would likely provoke a much stronger response. Russia is less effective in conventional warfare than expected, but it remains highly capable in hybrid strategies—information warfare, psychological pressure, and destabilization campaigns.

So while a direct attack is possible, it may not achieve the outcomes Russia seeks.

— They are investing billions into information warfare, yet some say they are still not winning it. Ukraine even managed to turn something like the Red Square parade into a symbolic moment. Is that the advantage of having a comedian as president?

— Yes, that contrast is often noted. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who came from comedy, has risen to the presidency, while Vladimir Putin appears to be moving in the opposite direction—from a position of authority toward something increasingly perceived as weak or even absurd.

This perception is not only present in the West but is beginning to emerge within Russia’s own power structure. In any system, when a leader appears weak or incapable of protecting elite interests, there is pressure for replacement. The difference is that in Russia, there are no formal rules for such transitions—only the logic of power and the emergence of another “strongman.”

Zelenskyy has recognized this moment and turned it into a powerful communication strategy, using satire to expose that weakness.

— So this is a turning point?

— Yes, but it is also a dangerous one. As long as Putin remains in power, the risk is not only conventional military action but also large-scale hybrid operations—cyberattacks, sabotage, political interference, and psychological warfare across Europe.

If Putin is replaced, the risk does not necessarily disappear. Instead of a hardline nationalist, there could be a seemingly moderate or “liberal” figure—such as Ksenia Sobchak—who appears acceptable to the West but still operates within the same system.

There is a risk that Western countries might misinterpret such a change as genuine transformation, believing that Russia has fundamentally changed, when in reality the underlying system remains intact.

— So you are saying that what we see now is the “real” Russia?

— Yes. Periods of openness or reform are the exception, not the norm. The current model—centralized power, militarism, and control—is the default state.

What often appears as liberalization has historically been temporary, used to rebuild strength before returning to a more authoritarian structure.

— Let’s talk about Ukraine. There are corruption scandals. How is this perceived in the West?

— Corruption exists everywhere. But it is important to distinguish between different types. Financial corruption—illegal enrichment—is damaging, but often limited in systemic impact.

More dangerous is nepotism. When unqualified individuals are promoted into positions of power, they replicate incompetence throughout the system. That leads to institutional decay.

Ukraine faces both challenges, but what matters is whether the system is dynamic—whether bad actors are removed and replaced. My impression is that Ukraine is functioning as a dynamic system that can correct itself over time.

— Do people in the West understand this nuance?

— Not really. Most people do not think about these issues in depth. There is sometimes concern about whether aid is being used effectively.

My view is that individuals should take responsibility—support organizations they trust and verify their effectiveness. Increasingly, Ukraine is also focusing not just on whether institutions are well-run, but whether they deliver results. That is a very important shift.

— So Ukraine is no longer just dependent on Western support?

— That is correct. Ukraine has moved from being primarily a recipient of aid to becoming a strategic actor. It still needs resources, especially for a decisive military outcome, but it is no longer in a position of dependency.

The likely outcome of the war is not purely military victory but pressure leading to internal collapse or breakdown within Russia. Ukraine’s role is to sustain that pressure.

— So Ukraine is becoming a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker?

— Exactly. Ukraine now has the ability to shape its own path. It no longer needs to accept every external condition tied to integration into institutions like European Union or NATO.

This is a major shift, though it is not yet widely recognized—even within Ukraine. There is still a certain humility, but over time, success will likely translate into greater confidence and institutional transformation.

— Will that shift become fully visible?

— Yes, especially if key objectives are achieved, such as restoring territorial integrity. That would create a strong sense of confidence and enable broader societal and institutional transformation.

Ukraine has developed qualities that are valuable beyond the battlefield—innovation, adaptability, and a willingness to challenge authority. These are traits that many Western societies need to relearn.

In a sense, Ukraine is not only defending itself but also helping to “immunize” the West against the influence of auth