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Putin’s War Economy Has Hit a Wall — and Money Won’t Fix It

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Putin’s War Economy Has Hit a Wall — and Money Won’t Fix It

Rather than facing sudden financial collapse, Russia is entering a period of prolonged economic exhaustion

On October 23, the Central Bank of Russia kept its key interest rate unchanged at 14% for the second consecutive meeting, raised its inflation forecast for 2026 to 7.1–7.6%, and acknowledged that underlying inflationary pressures remain elevated. The economy, meanwhile, is expected to grow by just 0.6%, while the budget deficit is projected to reach 3.2% of GDP.

These figures offer a different perspective on the recurring question of when Russia will run out of money. Financial resources do not disappear overnight. Instead, the rising cost of capital, driven by the pressures of a wartime economy, gradually squeezes investment and economic activity outside the defense sector. That is the fundamental difference between financial collapse and prolonged economic exhaustion.

Read the FULL article by Dmytro Levus, foreign policy expert, analyst at kyiv-based United Ukraine Think Tank.

Levus argues the prospects for monetary easing in Russia have narrowed fast. Between June 2025 and July 2026 the central bank cut its key rate ten times in a row, then paused the cycle for the first time in September and extended the pause in October. It also raised its forecast for the average 2027 key rate from 10.5-12.5% to 12.5-13.5%, effectively signaling another year of borrowing costs above 12%.

The expert notes that the 2026 inflation outlook has been revised upward twice, from 4.5-5.5% to 6-7% and now to 7.1-7.6%, while the growth forecast was cut from 0.5-1.5% to 0-1%. The October decision matched the expectations of all 20 analysts surveyed by Reuters. He explains why the bank has so little room: in the third quarter, seasonally adjusted price growth reached 8.0% annualized, up from 4.8% in the second, and core inflation rose from 4.5% to 6.2%. The regulator tied persistent underlying inflation of 5-6% partly to temporary reductions in production capacity in some sectors. Levus says this is consistent with the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, though the bank did not attribute all of it to the attacks. Since the start of the year, gasoline prices are up 21%, diesel 13.4%, and utility tariffs rose an average of 13.4% as of October 1, so inflation comes from fuel and utility costs as well as consumer demand.

Levus argues that expensive credit now presses in two directions. It restrains an economy expected to grow barely 0.6% this year, and it raises the cost of servicing government debt just as Moscow needs to borrow more. The government raised taxes to fund military spending and first aimed to cut the deficit to 1.6% of GDP from 2.6% in 2025. By the end of August the cumulative deficit was already 2.5% of GDP, and the full-year projection has risen to 3.2%, twice the original target. Each extra percentage point makes new debt costlier.

The expert describes an increasingly divided economy. Defense orders get preferential financing and guaranteed state demand, while civilian firms face market rates that can exceed the 14% policy rate, which makes long-term investment hard to justify. In his view the war is crowding out civilian activity not through dramatic bankruptcies but through investments never made, modernization postponed and equipment not replaced, which could leave Russia with deteriorating infrastructure, outdated technology and lower productivity long after the war.

Levus warns that fixating on the date Russia will run out of money can mislead. A state with its own currency, capital controls and a central bank able to supply domestic liquidity doesn’t simply run out of rubles. What becomes scarce is affordable capital, labor, productive capacity and the ability to grow without fueling inflation. He cites Elvira Nabiullina saying the room to lower rates depends on the parameters of the three-year federal budget and the inflationary effects of temporary production disruptions, which shows how tightly monetary policy is constrained by fiscal pressure and supply-side problems.

For Kyiv, he argues, the practical implication is that the central bank has publicly named temporary capacity reductions as a significant driver of persistent inflation. That is official evidence of how much supply disruptions, including in energy, matter, though it doesn’t establish a direct causal link between every refinery strike and rate decisions. Prolonged refinery outages can keep fuel supplies tight and raise production and transport costs, so Ukrainian long-range strikes may make it harder for the central bank to lower rates. The campaign, he stresses, is not producing an immediate collapse but gradually eroding Russia’s financial and industrial resilience. Because the effects are cumulative, he says they should be judged by the duration of outages, the cost of repairs and the resulting pressure on fuel prices and industry, not only by the number of successful strikes.

Levus notes that the next central bank meeting is on December 18. A modest cut remains possible, but the regulator hasn’t committed to further easing, and its 12.5-13.5% forecast for 2027 suggests elevated borrowing costs well into next year. He concludes that the pressure is best understood as a process of economic exhaustion rather than an approaching date of financial collapse, measured by the rising cost of sustaining the war, the investment opportunities sacrificed to finance it and the long-term damage to Russia’s productive capacity.

Read the FULL article on The Gaze: Putin’s War Economy Has Hit a Wall — and Money Won’t Fix It

Read also: Russia’s Frozen Assets: Why $300 Billion Is a Floor, Not a Ceiling

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